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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
"History never repeats itself" 
Valeri Zorkin, the onetime and once again Chairman of the Russian 
Constitutional Court probably should have known better than to utter such a 
challenge (quoted in MOSCOW TIMES 25 Feb 03 via Lexis-Nexis). History 
seems to do little but repeat itself in Russia. And we don't have to indulge in 
debates over whether Putin is the modern incarnation of Peter the Great or 
Yel'tsin his sickly half-brother Ivan, or the boy's namesake Ivan Terrible, recent 
Russian political history seems virtually stuck in automatic replay, especially now 
as elections loom. 
 
Does this sound familiar? There are two distinct groups within the Kremlin, each 
closely connected to the President; one has ties to the security services and the 
other is synonymous with market privatization. One side believes funneling large 
sums of money (often from questionable sources) into a splashy modern political 
campaign will win the hearts and minds of Russian voters. The other furtively 
traces and investigates the wellspring of the opposition's wealth, pouncing when 
one of the monied power brokers, or their bagmen, steps out of line -- quick to 
paint them as disloyal to the Boss. Their rallying cry is strength, order and fealty 
to the President. Defense of the President, of course, being the highest virtue, or 
so they tell him. All we need now is for Anatoli Chubais to shut down the power 
grid to the Kremlin, claim he's quashed a coup, and it could be 1996 all over 
again. Let's just hope Putin doesn't end up as "colossally fatigued" as Yel'tsin 
was after that particular presidential election. 
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For those keeping score, the battle lines then were drawn between "reformers" 
and "hard-liners." The current split is between oligarchs or "The Family" and 
"siloviki" or chekists. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Platon Lebedev and Yukos, 
archetypal oligarch representatives, are 'exposed' before the President as both 
profiteering leeches on Russia's dwindling resources and Communist supporters. 
The Oligarchs' P.R. machine answers that this persecution of financiers will stifle 
western investment and render the President's plan to double GDP stillborn. 
There's almost certainly a measure of truth all the way around the park in this 
rematch. What is missing this time is a strong leader with the authority to referee. 
Putin seems to have neither the personal, charismatic popularity nor the freedom 
of action separate from either faction of his partisans to stop the infighting and 
move forward, coherently, in one direction. 
 
But wait, wasn't there once a man who stood for a balance between Executive 
and Legislative power and who battled attempts by the Kremlin to assert the 
supremacy of Presidential whim in Russia's fledgling democracy? Wasn't he the 
one man who could unite all factions within the Kremlin apparat? They were 
united in opposition to him, and united they were as they ousted him from his 
post. Whatever happened to that man? Ah yes, he's the one hoping that history 
never repeats itself. 
 
Shuvalov matter revisited 
When Igor Shuvalov was shuffled from the White House to the Kremlin earlier 
this year, it was clear that the implications were less than stellar for his boss P.M. 
Mikhail Kasyanov. How things will turn out for Shuvalov however, is another 
matter altogether. 
 
There has been some speculation (See, for example, "A Jury Trial," IZVESTIYA 
17 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis), that Shuvalov's role in the Kremlin is to head up an 
organization, working parallel to the government, to assure the implementation of 
the goals laid out in President Putin's address to the Federal Assembly. It matters 
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little whether this move suggests that Putin has little faith in the ability of his 
Government to fulfill his proposals, or if he is just creating another organ to 
absorb the shock waves of disappointment should these plans not reach fruition. 
He has, like his predecessor before him, once again built mirror image bodies 
within the Kremlin and the Government, apparently in an attempt to leave himself 
plenty of options when the choice of a scapegoat comes around. 
 
The composition of the Kremlin-based group is meant to be representative of 
several of the various political and economic interest groups: Sergei Glazeyev 
from the Communist Party; Georgi Boos and Gennadi Kulik from the 
Fatherland/All-Russia movement; Vyacheslav Reznick and Oleg Kovalev from 
Unity; Sergei Ivanenko from Yabloko; and the oligarch Oleg Deripaska from 
Basic Element will be among the participants in the new "working group." (Ibid.) 
The longtime Kremlin economic adviser Andrei Illarionov will also be involved. 
 
The sinking ship? 
Yet another ministerial staffer has chosen to leave government service, and, 
unsurprisingly, he also has close ties to the Kremlin. Alexei Volin, the Deputy 
Chief of Staff in charge of Public Relations for the Prime Minister announced that 
he had submitted his resignation earlier this month. (MOSCOW TIMES 18 Jul 03 
via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Volin, who had served in the Yel'tsin Administration's Public relations Office as 
Deputy Chief from 1996 to 1998 went to work for the Government in May 1998. 
His willingness to critique the work of the Ministers earned him the reputation as 
a Kremlin operative in Government clothing. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
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Moscow maneuvers cautiously for leverage in Iraq 
Russia is positioning itself to regain its losses in Iraq (both financial and 
regarding its international stature). Teaming up with its anti-U.S. cronies from the 
pre-Iraq war days, Russia is attempting to set conditions to recover what it can of 
the debt owed to it and to keep alive the oil and other business contracts made 
with Iraq prior to the war. To accomplish this, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov is 
angling to keep the United States from getting the support it wants from the 
United Nations for its provisional Iraqi administration and for an international 
peacekeeping force. 
 
Ivanov began his campaign in mid-July with a tour of the Middle East that 
included stops in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. During the trip, the Foreign 
Minister highlighted Russia’s involvement as part of the Quartet in the 'road map' 
for Middle-East peace and stressed the need for additional steps to bring Syria 
and Lebanon into the "peace process". (RIA, 22 Jul 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) The other major issue discussed was the situation 
in Iraq, as Ivanov made phone calls during and after the trip to his counterparts in 
the U.S., U.K., Germany, Spain and France (all permanent or non-permanent 
members of the Security Council), as well as to U.N. Secretary General Kofi 
Annan, purportedly to share with them the results of his Middle East visits but 
more likely to lobby them for support for Russia’s position in the July 22 open 
session of the U.N. Security Council meeting on Iraq. 
 
The main themes of Moscow’s position are that U.N. involvement in post-war Iraq 
must increase (specifically in the establishment of the new Iraqi administration), 
and that Russia will not contribute forces to a peacekeeping effort unless it is 
under U.N. auspices. In support of this stance, Russia claims that immediate 
improvements are needed in Iraq, citing deteriorating humanitarian, political, 
security and economic conditions since the end of the war. (RUSSIAN 
CHANNEL ONE TV, 22 Jul 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets) Ivanov 
stresses that only the international community can properly resolve these 
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problems and it must do so with a new Security Council resolution that will 
"provide clear prospects for a political settlement and help the structures that will 
be formed in Iraq, in particular the provisional administrative council, and act on 
the basis of such a plan." (INTERFAX, 18 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0718 via 
World News Connection) 
 
The foreign minister, however, has made no attempt to hide Russia’s true 
intentions in the affair, stating bluntly during his Middle East tour that "Russia's 
role in the post-war settlement in Iraq is a key task for the country's diplomatic 
corps," and that "the crux of the matter is that Russia had considerable economic 
interests in Iraq and continues to retain these interests today." (RIA NOVOSTI, 
16 Jul 03 via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) #7251, 16 Jul 03) Ivanov is attempting, 
of course, to make the future Iraqi government acknowledge (and eventually pay) 
the debts Saddam Hussein’s regime owed to Russia, which according to a report 
by Russia’s Channel One TV (14 Jul 03 via JRL #7251, 16 Jul 03) total over U.S. 
$8.5 billion – a formidable task even if the Baghdad government is not 
handpicked by the United States. The report also estimates that Russia could 
lose an additional $40 billion if planned joint oil projects fall through in Iraq. 
Currently, the report calculates, Russia stands to regain a mere one sixth of the 
money owed to it unless Moscow can win influence in the new Iraqi leadership 
and post-war economic planning, hence the foreign ministry’s attempts to recruit 
partners in the Security Council to disrupt U.S. authority in Iraq. 
 
Another area of concern is that of pre-war business contracts between Iraq and 
Russian companies. Significant money stands to be lost if these contracts are 
deemed invalid. Back in June, during President Putin’s visit to London, Russian 
officials there declared that Moscow would insist that Russian contracts 
concluded with the regime of deposed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein be 
honored by any successor government and that such contracts "have an 
impeccable international legal basis." (ITAR-TASS via RFE/RL Vol. 4, No. 26, 1 
July 2003) The Russians have already received some assurance from the US 
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Ambassador to Moscow, Alexander Vershbow, that the U.S. is willing to allow 
Russia to do business in Iraq. Indeed, some business contracts are being 
revived; Russian diplomats, according to a RIA Novosti report, (16 Jul 03 via JRL 
#7251, 16 Jul 03) have already managed to convince the U.S. side that top-
priority Russian corporate agreements must continue to be enforced even after 
the Oil-for-Food program expires on 21 November 2003. Among these contracts 
is a €44 million deal with Russia’s Volga automobile manufacturer for the delivery 
of 5,000 cars to equip Baghdad’s taxi fleet. (ITAR-TASS, 21 Jul 03; BBC 
Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Despite such positive developments for Russia, the Kremlin remains frustrated 
over U.S. unwillingness to make concessions regarding Moscow’s most prized oil 
most contracts in Iraq. Vershbow made clear that, although the United States 
intends to do no harm to the interests of Russian companies, "Iraqi oil… 
belong[s] to the Iraqi people, and decisions about [its] development and future 
production will be taken by the future Iraqi government." This position resulted in 
the U.S.’s suspension of contracts signed by Russian companies with the former 
Iraqi regime. (AFP, 15 Jul 03 via JRL #7249, 14 Jul 03) Mikhail Bogdanov, who 
heads the Russian Foreign Ministry's Middle East and North Africa department, 
calls this a delaying tactic by the U.S. and pro-U.S. Iraqis, which jeopardizes 
multi-billion dollar contracts such as the one signed with LUKoil before the war to 
develop the Western Kurna oil deposit. (RIA NOVOSTI, 16 Jul 03 via JRL #7251, 
16 Jul 03) 
 
The Russian foreign ministry recently also rebuffed statements by Ambassador 
Vershbow that the U.S. did not recognize the legitimacy of the Russian 
diplomatic mission in Baghdad and therefore would no longer be responsible for 
its security. Additionally, Vershbow suggested that Moscow may have 
information about the whereabouts of members of the former Iraqi regime that it 
is withholding from the United States. (RUSSIAN CHANNEL ONE TV, 14 Jul 03 
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via JRL #7250, 16 Jul 03) President Putin has not commented publicly on these 
developments. 
 
At the July 22 open session of the U.N. Security Council on Iraq, the Russian 
First Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations, Gennadi Gatilov, began his 
remarks with a humanitarian hook, "It is a prime task of the international 
community to help the people of Iraq to find a way out of the crisis," but quickly 
got to the point that Russia is confident this can only be done "with respect 
for…its right to dispose of natural resources," (read "oil"). (ITAR-TASS, 22 Jul 03; 
BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Igor Ivanov’s efforts seem 
to have worked as the Security Council withheld, at least for the time being, 
support for the U.S.-created Iraqi government and refused to send in 
peacekeeping troops without renewed U.N. authorization. Reflecting some rather 
petulant foreign tactics, Gunter Pleuger, the German envoy at the U.N., 
suggested that the council just wants to make Washington "sweat it out" before 
they endorse the ruling body in Baghdad. This is an attempt to give Russia, 
France and others the bargaining power they need with the U.S. in order to 
negotiate outstanding oil and other business contracts. (THE BOSTON GLOBE, 
23 Jul 03) 
 
It is unclear if such pressure, despite its apparent success in the Security 
Council, will have a long term positive effect on Russian economic interests in 
Iraq — especially considering the U.S.’s recent success in the killing of Saddam 
Hussein’s two sons. The Russian Foreign Ministry was quick to announce its 
opinion that this particular military achievement would not improve the situation in 
Iraq. (RUSSIAN CHANNEL ONE TV, 23 Jul 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
Despite the importance of these debts and business contracts and the 
international support Moscow has acquired on this issue, the Russians, in this 
process of seeking leverage against the U.S., tread cautiously and use minor 
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tones with the Americans and British, unlike the sparring that took place in the 
pre-war debates. Moreover, President Putin seems to be aware of the narrow 
fence he is walking between the practical need to maintain a healthy relationship 
with the U.S. and the political necessity to avoid upsetting those at home who 
disapprove of any kowtowing to the Americans. His silence on the matter may 
also indicate his limited confidence in success, as he lets Igor Ivanov lead the 
charge and also potentially absorb the blame should he come home empty-
handed. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
REGIONS 
All’s well that ends... 
The much-discussed (and, in Russia, -decried) new transit system between 
Kaliningrad and points east came into effect with nary a whimper, despite a 
couple of bumps in the road. 
 
A "facilitated travel document," that is, a simplified visa allowing for multiple 
entries, became required paperwork on 1 July. It resulted from months-long 
negotiations involving Moscow, Vilnius and the European Union this past winter 
over transit through Lithuania, which is due to join the EU next year. During the 
negotiations, tempers and rhetoric flared, as Russia claimed it was being abused, 
while Lithuania declared it was being ignored. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 9 Apr 03) 
 
Yet, as temperatures rose this summer, attitudes cooled. On the first day the 
system was instituted, nearly one-third of the passengers were removed from the 
Chelyabinsk-Kaliningrad train for lack of the proper documentation. Lithuania 
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State Border Guards Chief Algimantas Songaila was neither surprised nor 
worried. "As far as trains coming from Moscow are concerned, we have much 
fewer problems there [sic] and in my opinion, the percentage of passengers 
taken off those trains is really low for the first day," he said. Songaila blamed 
Russia for not informing potential passengers adequately about the new 
requirements, particularly the need to apply for tickets 24 hours in advance. 
(LITHUANIAN RADIO, 0900 GMT, 1 Jul 03, BBC Monitoring via Global 
NewsBank) 
 
Such a lack of communication is surprising, given the amount of discussion on 
the topic a few months ago. Especially, as Lithuanian presidential envoy and 
Seimas MP Gediminas Kukilas pointed out, "an absolute majority of those who 
were taken off trains are Kaliningrad residents who for whatever reason believe 
that this [new] procedure applies to other Russians but not to Kaliningrad Region 
residents." (LITHUANIAN RADIO, 1200 GMT, 2 Jul 03, BBC Monitoring via 
Global NewsBank) 
 
While Lithuanian authorities downplayed the number of individuals removed in 
the first two days as "less than a hundred," (Ibid.), other coverage noted "chaos," 
"angry scenes" and children on holiday being taken off trains. (DEUTSCHE 
PRESS-AGENTUR, 1 Jul 03 via Global NewsBank) However, what could have 
become a public relations nightmare was ignored, intentionally, in Moscow. The 
Russian government decided not to make an issue out of the situation. 
(WWW.PRAVDA.RU, 3 Jul 03 via english.pravda.ru) Indeed, Dmitri Rogozin, 
Putin’s envoy for Kaliningrad issues, had signaled the Kremlin’s new attitude a 
few days earlier, declaring that the travel issues had been resolved, and that a 
Kaliningrad-Moscow air taxi was scheduled to start functioning as of 30 June, to 
provide a lower-cost alternative to second-class train fares. (INTERFAX, 0719 
GMT, 27 Jun 03, BBC Monitoring via Global NewsBank) Moreover, he added, 
ferry options were being explored. 
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The rosy outlook continues through the month of July. Russian Foreign Minister 
Igor Ivanov and his counterpart in Vilnius, Antana Valionis, discussed the new 
system last week and the assessment reportedly was positive. (RIA NOVOSTI, 
24 Jul 03 via en.rian.ru) 
 
How do you say ‘ironic’? 
Speaking of Russo-Baltic relations, Moscow has instituted a new law strikingly 
similar to Baltic legislation it challenged long and hard only some years ago. The 
education ministry has announced that materials to test Russian-language 
fluency, a requirement of the law "On Citizenship of the Russian Federation," 
have been registered with the justice ministry and distributed to educational 
institutions. (RIA NOVOSTI, 25 Jul 03 via en.rian.ru) Individuals must 
demonstrate a "basic general command of the Russian language" before being 
granted citizenship. 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Bell tolls for regional parties 
There are no more regional parties, according to Yelena Dubrovina of the Central 
Election Commission. "From now on, only federation-wide political parties will be 
able to take part in elections to all bodies of state parties," she said. To date, the 
justice ministry has registered 52 parties. (CHANNEL ONE TV, 1100 GMT, 14 
Jul 03 BBC Monitoring via Global NewsBank) 
 
One of the registered parties is, decidedly, not the faction of the Liberal Party that 
backed Boris Berezovsky. With the oligarch still in exile in London, and the 
chairman, Mikhail Kodanev, entangled in the police investigation of the murder of 
MP Sergei Yushenkov, (THE NIS OBSERVED, 9 Jul 03) the faction became 
leaderless less than a month after its followers voted to support Berezovsky and 
Yushenkov. When Berezovsky tried to cope with the newest "snag," by inviting 
Ivan Rybkin to chair the faction, the justice ministry refused to validate its papers. 
"At present, only one [liberal] party is registered at the Justice Ministry -- it is 
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chaired by Viktor Pokhmelkin and Boris Zolotukhin," Deputy Justice Minister 
Yevgeni Sidorenko explained (WWW.PRAVDA.RU, 16 Jul 03 via 
english.pravda.ru) 
 
Despite the fact that two previous chairmen of the competing faction (Sergei 
Yushenkov and Vladimir Golovlev) were assassinated, Pokhmelkin refused to 
consider what some could term the "safe" route out of the party conflict: joining 
Boris Berezovsky. "He has done his best to discredit the liberal movement, he is 
a person of no principles, he does not have any political objectives, he is simply 
trying to get away from the legal persecution on the part of the Russian 
government," Pokhmelkin said. (WWW.PRAVDA.RU, 16 Jun 03 via 
english.pravda.ru) One cannot help but be startled by the clarity of the politician’s 
position. 
 
Not being registered is the least of the problems for Kodanev and his aide, 
Aleksandr Vinnik, who are among those arrested for alleged roles in the 
Yushenkov assassination, according to police. The suspected wheelman and 
lookout, Vladimir Palkov and Anton Drozd, were picked up on 10 July, bringing 
the number of suspects to six. "The investigation presumes that two of these 
people, residents of Syktyvkar, carried out the killing, and two others [Kodanev 
and Vinnik], organized the assassination," police said. (INTERFAX, 1517 GMT, 
10 Jul 03, BBC Monitoring via Global NewsBank) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Maolmordha McGowan 
 
National insecurity, as provided by the Federal Security Service 
Platon Lebedev, chief financial strategist for Yukos oil and head of Menatep, a 
subsidiary of Yukos, spent the last three weeks in the FSB’s state criminal prison 
at Lefortovo. He was arrested ostensibly for embezzling $283 million when he 
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purchased the state-owned fertilizer company Apapit in 1994, though the time 
elapsed since the incident coupled with the selective prosecution of privatization 
crimes suggest that his arrest was political. It is widely believed that Lebedev’s 
boss, CEO of Yukos and Russia’s reputed richest man, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 
was the implied target. (MOSCOW TIMES, 16 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis.) On 2 July, 
the Prosecutor General's Office announced that Lebedev had been taken in for 
questioning after on a request from the Duma Economic Policy and 
Entrepreneurship Committee Deputy Chairman Vladimir Yudin, based on a 
Duma probe which contended that Lebedev misapropriated 20 percent of the 
shares of Apapit. (Tass, 3 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis) During the same week, Yukos' 
offices were raided and ransacked by unidentified masked men. The FSB later 
took Yukos security chief Aleksei Pichugin into custody (VEDOMOSTI, 25 Jul 03 
via Lexis-Nexis) and handed his case over to the Prosecutor-General’s Office, 
which initiated investigations into supposed tax violations, attempted murders, 
theft and seven cases of homicide. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 25 Jul 03 via 
Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Within days, seven investigations were open against Yukos, its employees, 
subsidiaries, and Khodorkovsky himself. (ITAR-TASS, 23 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
While Lebedev has been held in prison for three weeks and denied bail by the 
Moscow City Court on 23 July, claims against him have not been substantiated, 
and there are, of course, other charges of misconduct. (MOSCOW TIMES 25 
July 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Olga Yegorova, head of the Moscow City Court, is 
considered a close ally of the Kremlin operative believed to have a hand in the 
investigations, Viktor Ivanov. (MOSCOW TIMES 25 July 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
Pichugin’s lawyer Tatiana Akimtseva said her client was drugged by 
investigators, and then pressured into confessing to bogus charges. 
(NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 25 July 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Clashes between the security services and the oligarchs are nothing new, though 
the drive against the $11 billion man Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his empire has 
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startled the international business community. Since the scandal broke, the 
Russian stock market has lost over $20 billion in value as foreign capital flees 
amid fears that the security services are nearing a full-scale attack on the 
economy. (MOSCOW TIMES, 24 Jul 03 via Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, 24 
Jul 03) Yukos is an internationally-respected corporation, withstanding the 
scrutiny of Western investors through its transparency and predictability. 
Khodorkovsky has distinguished himself from other oligarchs by spending his 
resources promoting pro-Western ideas and supporting a close, cooperative 
U.S.-Russia partnership. He announced recently that he would leave the 
business world in 2007, rousing speculation that he may seek to become Putin’s 
successor in 2008. (ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 22 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
Khodorkovsky has also announced that Yukos intends to merge with Sibneft to 
create the world’s 4th largest oil company, in possession of greater proven 
petroleum reserves than any other single firm. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE 
(AFP), 26 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis) This may have prompted Audit Chamber head 
Sergei Stepashin to suggest that Sibneft would be next on the list of targets when 
he told the media that it was one of the nation’s "biggest tax cheats." (MOSCOW 
TIMES, 8 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Fearing he may indeed be next for the 
treatment that the Kremlin is giving Khodorkovsky, Sibneft CEO Roman 
Abramovich allegedly is preparing to flee to the U.K., where he recently bought a 
soccer club, an apartment, and a villa. [(LONDON) SUNDAY EXPRESS, 13 July 
03 via Lexis-Nexis] 
 
Clearly, Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s power and principles have not made him a 
favorite of President Putin. He became an explicit rival of the establishment 
when, on 7 April, he announced his intention to participate openly in politics by 
financially supporting Yabloko and the Union of Rightist Forces (SPS). 
(VEDOMOSTI, 8 Apr 03 via Lexis-Nexis) At the time, Khodorkovsky had been 
courting SPS leader Boris Nemtsov for support on the issue of private financing 
of oil pipelines. The Kremlin has consistently opposed these measures, which 
substantially increase the power of private oil firms. (ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
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28 Mar 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Khodorkovsky clearly believes the future of Russian 
business should not lie exclusively in the hands of the Putin establishment. 
 
Some in Putin's administration obviously do not believe that the business 
empires of the oligarchs should drive the future of Russia. Russian media have 
reported that former FSB agents, deputy heads of the Kremlin administration, 
and trusted Putin advisors, Igor Sechin and Victor Ivanov are behind the push 
against Yukos. (KOMMERSANT-VLAST, 21 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Both Ivanov 
and Sechin worked with Putin in the 1990s at the St. Petersburg FSB 
department, and both followed Putin to the Kremlin. The two are informal leaders 
of a faction within the Kremlin administration connected to Putin via the FSB and 
St. Petersburg called, as Kommersant-Vlast has dubbed them, "FSB Inc." FSB 
director Nikolai Patrushev, whose officers made the arrest, and Prosecutor-
General Vladimir Ustinov, whose investigators are pursuing the cases, are also 
part of this faction. FSB Inc. seems to be settling into a struggle with an older 
faction within the Kremlin, holdovers from the Yel'tsin "Family" who created 
United Russia to support Yel'tsin’s then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in the 
presidential succession and election. This group includes the current Prime 
Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, as well as the co-chairmen of United Russia, 
Emergency Situations Minister Sergei Shoigu, Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov, and 
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. (MOSCOW TIMES, 8 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis) 
Corruption investigations by the FSB and Prosecutor General’s Office now focus 
on Shoigu’s deputy and Luzhkov’s crime police, all of whom serve within 
Gryzlov’s MVD, (see NIS Observed, 10 Jul 03). These various moves may be 
viewed as part of a larger operation by FSB Inc. to sideline the old-Kremlin 
faction of the Putin administration. 
 
While he has remained quiet so far on the issue of the raids, Putin may have 
played a direct role in ordering or endorsing the investigations. Knocking the 
‘haves’ in Russian society tends to pay election dividends, though Putin’s 
personal approval remains comfortably high. Boris Nemtsov has accused Putin 
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of simple bullying, and sending a clear message to Khodorkovsky and the other 
oligarchs about "who is in charge" in Russia, a perfectly reasonable theory. 
(INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 22 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis) Soon after 
taking power in 2000, Putin brokered an informal deal with the oligarchs, wherein 
the tycoons agreed to stay out of politics and Putin allowed the businessmen to 
keep the assets gained during the lawless era of privatization. Both sides have 
repeatedly broken the rules, culminating in demonstrations of power by Putin and 
with collapse of the empires within Russia of Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir 
Gusinsky. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 17 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis) FSB Inc at 
least, and possibly Putin himself, would like to see Khodorkovsky go out the 
same way. 
 
At the time of the Yukos raids, the President was in Britain promoting Russia as a 
safe haven for investment. Putin's administration has shown a special touch for 
irony, and well-timed trips abroad as, for example, the last time an oligarch 
(Gusinsky) was under serious pressure by the administration, Putin was visiting 
Spain and professing ignorance of the matter. (THE ECONOMIST, 17 Jun 03 via 
Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The FSB, following a long tradition among Russian security organs, is very 
suspicious of powerful elements within Russian society that appear to be sources 
of foreign influence. Khodorkovsky’s Western-friendly beliefs and his decision to 
use his money to support these ideas and viewed as particularly threatening by 
the conservative FSB faction, making him a target of FSB Inc. By weakening or 
taking over Khodorkovsky’s empire, they could diminish external interests as well 
as the oligarch’s lobby, and secure for themselves positions of power and wealth 
for the foreseeable future. 
 
This has left Putin on the fence, with his closest allies and friends from the FSB 
on one side and the United Russia party that has provided a political base for his 
presidency, replete with the oligarchs who challenge his policies, on the other. 
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Mikhail Kasyanov has demonstrated solidarity among "Family" members by 
making it clear that he supports the oligarchs, a move that may not score many 
points for United Russia. It appears that Putin will side with him and rein in FSB 
Inc., if for no other reason than to protect an economy badly damaged by the 
investigation. On 23 July, Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that the old-Kremlin 
faction had won over Putin in the debate, and that the President would probably 
issue a statement condemning both the oligarchs and the security services 
sometime after his return from overseas. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 23 July 03 
via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
In this struggle for power and wealth between the two factions of the Kremlin, the 
clear loser will be the people of the state they fight to control. There may not be 
much money left to embezzle, enemies left to force into exile, or offices left to 
raid by the time the dust settles. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Nadezda Kinsky 
 
BELARUS 
Gaining momentum? 
President Lukashenka of Belarus sacked his Prime Minister Henady Novitski, 
Deputy Prime Minister Alyaksandr Papkou, Agriculture Minister Mikhail Rusy and 
Anatol Kusma (Head of the State Concern for Food Industry) on July 10. He 
charged them all with being "ineffective, failing to keep presidential orders to 
protect the people's well-being or pay agrarian workers, and also falsifying and 
misrepresenting information." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 10 Jul 03 via Lexis-
Nexis). They were replaced by Syarhey Sidorski as Prime Minister, Raman 
Unuchka as Deputy Prime Minister, Zyanon Lomats as Agriculture Minister, and 
Uladzimir Dauzhankou as State Concern for the Food Industry head. The 
accusation of falsifying facts is particularly amusing: Lukashenka's regime itself 
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has rather blatantly falsified economic reports beyond all recognition throughout 
his tenure, in order to support the entirely unfounded claim that Belarus was the 
"economic tiger" of the CIS states. The president made this assertion repeatedly 
in the 1990's. Lukashenka also claims that the reshuffle was undertaken only 
because of the need to gain momentum in meeting Belarus' economic targets, 
which the previous ministers had not been able to do. An instruction went out to 
the Agriculture Ministry on July 22, that all wage arrears to farmers - which 
amount to about 22 billion rubles (about U.S. $10.6 million) are to be paid out by 
July 31. 
 
In response to rumors that he was preparing the ground for a referendum that 
would allow him to extend his tenure in office beyond the two terms anchored in 
the constitution, he answered: "These are downright lies!" Lukashenka's second 
term won't end until 2006, but already the opposition is watching the President 
closely for fear that he will introduce a term extension referendum - with some 
expecting such a move to occur before this year is out. Some have voiced the 
opinion that with this latest shuffle, Lukashenka is trying to win back voters by 
laying the blame for the country's dismal economic situation at the feet of his 
underlings. "Lukashenka is well aware that he will not win with a 12.8 percent 
approval rating, therefore he is trying to win back voters disenchanted with his 
rule. It is not accidental that he targeted agriculture, where his most loyal 
supporters are employed," said Anatol Lyabedzka, leader of the opposition 
United Civic Party. (BELAPAN, 10 Jul 03 via BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
In the meantime, Western observers are continuing to push for measures on 
democratization and electoral reform in Belarus. On July 10, the US embassy in 
Minsk issued a statement in order to draw attention to "the ninth anniversary of 
the last election recognized by the international community as being democratic 
in character" (Full text available at: http://www.usis.minsk.by). The statement 
urges a return to the democratic standards and practices reached in Belarus in 
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1994. The OSCE assembly likewise adopted a resolution on July 9, urging a free, 
fair and transparent electoral system be put in place in Belarus. 
 
The Belarusian parliamentary reshuffle has all the signs of the beginning of a 
larger-scale purge of the upper ranks of the regime. In the wake of the reshuffle, 
over 30 officials in the Minsk regional administration were either sacked or 
severely reprimanded for their poor performance. Lukashenka moreover stated 
that one third of government posts will be filled with new persons in the near 
future (BBC Monitoring, 10 Jul 03 via Lexis-Nexis). Education Minister Pyotr 
Brigadin and Information Minister Mikhail Podgainy are said to have resigned 
from their posts. They had also made themselves highly unpopular with the 
electorate and could easily serve as scapegoats for Lukashenka in his bid to 
improve his public image and remind the population and the political elites in 
Belarus just who is in charge. 
 
UKRAINE 
Freedom of the Press? 
The Verkhovna Rada adopted a bill on July 9 that has made Ukraine once again 
the center of considerable concern among international media watchdogs. 
According to the new legislation, journalists can no longer legally protect their 
sources, and any journalist who is accused of revealing state secrets is now 
subject to arrest. Moreover, security services can detain journalists, search their 
houses and conduct invasive body searches on them if they are suspected of 
investigating state secrets and are "intending to publish their information". This 
clearly conflicts with the journalistic duty to disseminate information in the public 
interest, and appears designed to put investigative journalists personally at risk. 
 
Head of the parliamentary Committee for Freedom of Speech and Information, 
Mykola Tomenko, the Head of the Ukrainian Union of Journalists, Ihor 
Lubchenko, and other prominent figures from the world of media, politics and 
academics in Ukraine sent an open letter to Kuchma urging him to veto the bill. 
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According to them, it was adopted in accord with the parliamentary code. 
(UNIAN, 15 Jul 03 via BBS Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
International organizations also reacted immediately. On July 15, Freimund 
Duve, OSCE representative on the Freedom of Media, wrote a letter to the 
Ukrainian Foreign Minster Anatoli Zlenko in which he outlined his worries that this 
law will strengthen the state secret services and further undermine Ukrainian 
media freedom. "It is ominous that your country," writes Duve, "where the media 
situation has been steadily deteriorating for the past five years, should decide at 
this point to approve a highly restrictive law that would have a chilling effect on 
the work of journalists, especially those investigating corruption." (Full text 
available at: http://www.osce.org). 
 
Another major concern is that the judiciary could be bypassed in such cases, with 
the real power of decision resting with government forces and security services. 
Spokesman for the OSCE, Alexandr Ivanko, stated his particular worry that the 
legislation was very vague about the kind of information that could lead to 
prosecution of a journalist. Robert Menard of the French media watchdog 
Reporters without Borders called it a "death sentence for investigative 
journalism." Reporters without Borders also noted that this law would put 
journalists even more at the mercy of the security authorities than they are now. 
The organization's secretary-general said that the parliament was breaking basic 
principles of press freedom by "choosing to give the intelligence services carte 
blanche to do as they will with journalists, especially those who report cases of 
corruption that could embarrass the authorities". The legislation, according to 
Robert Menard, would give journalists "no choice but to take refuge in self-
censorship" (http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=7566). 
 
As if to underline the potential ramifications of the steady deterioration of the 
media situation in Ukraine, July 14 saw the death of newspaper and TV editor 
Vladimir Efremov in a car accident. Car accidents have an ominous history in 
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Ukraine where they have more than once appeared to be remarkably convenient 
for the government. Efremov, a critic of President Kuchma's regime and 
supporter of former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, was scheduled to appear at 
a United States hearing on August 18 in connection with Lazarenko's 
embezzlement charges. Reporters without Borders, for whom Efremov acted as 
a representative in Ukraine, immediately issued a statement calling for an 
investigation into the cause of the car crash. In October 2001, the editor claimed 
that he was afraid he would be killed for his journalistic activities and specifically 
mentioned a staged car crash as a probable method 
(www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=7515). The Institute for Mass Information in 
Ukraine is investigating the case. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Low ranking 
When the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) annual Human 
Development Report was released on 8 July, Moldova had no cause for 
celebration over the results. The report ranked Moldova 108th out of 175 
countries, making it the lowest ranked country in Europe – with the nearest 
European neighbor on the table being Turkey (which at 96th was 12 places 
higher up the scale). The report calculates its scores based on each country's per 
capita GDP, average life expectancy, adult literacy rate and education 
enrollment. While the Moldovan adult literacy rate is at 99%, Moldovans have an 
average life expectancy of only 68.5 years, combined primary, secondary and 
tertiary education enrollment stands at 61% and the per capita GDP is listed as 
U.S. $2,150. The report is available online at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003. 
 
Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev responded to the report's publication on July 9, 
saying that he did not agree with the ranking. While admitting that Moldova's 
living standards had slipped considerably over the past several years since the 
breakup of the USSR, he did not agree that Moldova's development rating 
deserved to be the worst in Europe. Moldova remains highly dependent on 
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Russia and is haunted by challenges to its territorial integrity – most notably in 
the Transdniestr breakaway republic and the Gagauz-Yeri region. According to 
the United Nations Development Program, Moldova is among several countries 
who need international support in order to recover from their current plight and 
begin working toward a higher standard of living for their populations. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
South Azerbaijan rising? 
The students’ mass protests in Iran raise important issues for Azerbaijani foreign 
and domestic politics. The Azeri population of Iran, which by various estimates 
numbers between 16 million and 35 million, represents the largest single minority 
in Iran and is at least twice the population of Azerbaijan itself. (Eurasianet, 15 Apr 
03) The political awakening of this group constitutes a serious challenge not only 
to the existing government of Iran but also to Azerbaijani authorities. 
 
Although some fringe activists in Turkey and Azerbaijan have called for a 
unification of Azerbaijan and "south Azerbaijan," the most frequently aired 
demands focus on language and cultural rights for the Azeris of Iran. In recent 
weeks Azeri activists have called for a federalization of Iran and an autonomous 
republic for the Azeri minority (Such a republic existed briefly during the Soviet 
World War 2 occupation of northern Iran). However from the perspective of the 
Azerbaijani government this outcome would shift the Azeri national focus to the 
larger Iranian Azeri population. Hence the governments in Baku and Teheran are 
both threatened by the political activism of the Iranian Azeri national movement. 
 
In June, the student protests spread far beyond Teheran and included Tabriz, the 
center of the Azeri population. Tabriz University students staged a walkout 
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chanting in the Azerbaijani language, "Khatami resign!" and "Freedom to 
nations!" The protests were dispersed violently leading to a number of injuries 
and at least 400 arrests. (Lider TV, 19 Jun 03 via BBC Monitoring.) A state of 
emergency was imposed in Tabriz but was not officially announced. In the city 
Kerman, mass actions lasted five days before crowds were dispersed by troops. 
In Esfahan, the troops killed a demonstrator. (Zerkalo, 20 Jun 03) 
 
On July 3 and 4 Azeris made a traditional pilgrimage to the grave of national hero 
Babak at Fort Bazz in Northern Iran. In the 9th century Babak fought against the 
Arab conquest and has become a symbol of Azeri nationalism. Despite Iranian 
efforts to prevent this march from taking place, this year a record number of 
Azeris participated and for the first time the marchers hoisted Azeribaijani flags. 
[According to the Congress of World Azerbaijanis there were 800,000 
participants. (Zerkalo, 4 Jul 03) According to the National Revival Movement 
there were 2 million marching. (Ekho, 5 Jul 03)] The march was an act of civil 
disobedience on a massive scale – the participants came despite official 
admonishments and the presence of the Iranian military. 
 
In the West, Mahmudali Chehregani, the leader of the National Revival 
Movement, a political dissident – and former professor at Tabriz University is the 
leading spokesman of the Azeris of Iran. He was imprisoned briefly in Iran three 
years ago and subsequently moved to the United States. During a visit to Baku 
on June 14, Chehregani told veterans of the Karabakh war that an army of one 
million of their co-ethnics "is ready to fight for Karabakh." According to 
Chehregani, there will be a federative government in Iran within 18 months. 
(ANS, 3 Jul 03, BBC Monitoring) Among the sites he visited in Baku was the 
memorial to the victims of the 1991 Soviet repression of Azeri demonstrators and 
the grave of Abulfaz Elchibey, the Soviet era dissident and the first president of 
the independent Azerbaijani state (ANS, 2 Jul 03, BBC Monitoring). 
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This enthusiastic and populist message hearkens back to Azerbaijan's own 
nationality movement of the early 1990s which those in power presently would 
prefer to forget. With the presidential elections only two months away, the last 
thing the government of the ailing Heyder Aliev needs is a reminder of 
Azerbaijan's charismatic leader Abulfaz Elchibey and of the expectations and 
ambitions of that earlier period. Aliev has been undergoing treatment in Turkey 
and has not been seen in Azerbaijan for over two weeks. He is widely expected 
to die before the elections. However neither "the family" around Aliev nor the 
opposition seems to have a strategy for contesting the elections. Both camps are 
divided by fierce rivalries and no leading candidates have emerged. 
 
The crisis in Iran also poses complicated dilemmas for Azerbaijani foreign policy. 
Azerbaijan has agreed to send a small peacekeeping contingent to Iraq, and now 
rumors abound that Azerbaijan may be similarly engaged if the U.S. decides to 
apply greater pressure against Iran. Azerbaijani leaders have offered the U.S. 
bases in the past and have said that they would like to join NATO eventually. 
However, mindful of the powerful neighbors Russia and Iran, the Azeris must be 
very careful about any cooperation with the U.S. on the subject of Iran, and the 
foreign minister Vilayat Quliyev denies that any approaches have been made by 
the U.S. government. (ANS, 19 Jun 03, BBC Monitoring.) The independent daily 
Ekho reported, however that Iran has already sent a note to Baku threatening 
that any U.S. deployment in Azerbaijan would be perceived as an "act of 
aggression and Iran reserves the right to carry out a preventive strike." (Ekho, 19 
Jun 03, BBC Monitoring) At the same time, Azeris must consider the possibility 
that the U.S. may employ the good offices of Armenia to explore relations with 
Iran, leaving Azerbaijan isolated. Hence, U.S. decisions on its policy and 
approaches in the region will, to a large extent, determine the direction 
Azerbaijan follows. At present, the only thing that seems certain is that 
monumental political challenges are looming in Iran and Azerbaijan, and none of 
the domestic or international actors have elaborated a strategy to address them. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Joel Hafvenstein 
 
OIL AND GAS 
Pipeline Politics 
Over the last two weeks, Russia's Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller has been making 
the rounds in Central Asia. In Tashkent, he and Uzbek president Islam Karimov 
reaffirmed their "strategic cooperation" agreement of last year, under which 
Uzbekistan hopes to pipe 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year to 
Russia by 2005. (INTERFAX, 1620 GMT, 22 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0722 via 
World News Connection) For both Karimov and Gazprom, the "strategy" behind 
the agreement is the marginalization of key rivals: respectively, Turkmenistan 
and Itera, a privately held Russian gas trading company. 
 
Uzbekistan sees an opportunity to outflank Turkmenistan, which has much larger 
natural gas reserves but is dependent on the Central Asia-Center pipeline to 
send its gas to market in Russia and Ukraine. That pipeline, which passes 
through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, has a potential capacity of 70 billion cubic 
meters; due to disrepair however, it may now be able to operate at no more than 
60% capacity. Interestingly, Uzbek Prime Minister Otkir Sultonov recently gave 
an even lower estimate, suggesting that given "possible restrictions and the wear 
and tear of the republic's trunk gas pipeline network, the amount of gas transit 
intended for Uzbek northern neighbors will not be more than 20-25 billion cubic 
meters." This startling admission was the pretext for a declaration that first 
priority would be given to Uzbek supplies, and that only the "spare capacity" 
would be available for Turkmen gas shipments to other northern customers. 
(INTERFAX, 1251 GMT, 15 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0715 via World News 
Connection) If the pipeline has deteriorated as far as Sultonov suggests, there 
will doubtless be very little capacity to spare. To protect itself from possible 
retaliation, Uzbekistan has declared that it will build a pipeline to supply its 
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southern regions with gas without (as at present) piping it through Turkmenistan. 
(INTERFAX, 1123 GMT, 17 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0717 via World News 
Connection) 
 
Gazprom, meanwhile, has the Uzbek government’s support in its attempt to lock 
Itera out of the Central Asian gas market. Four days before Sultonov’s 
declaration, the Turkmen government signed a contract with Itera and Ukraine to 
ship 36 billion cubic meters to Ukraine (its largest customer) and 10 billion to 
Itera over the next year. (INTERFAX, 1423 GMT, 11 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0711 via World News Connection) Uzbekistan has explicitly refused to ship those 
10 billion cubic meters or sign any contract with Itera. Sultonov pointedly 
suggested that "countries such as Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, which buy 
natural gas from Itera, should draw certain conclusions." (INTERFAX, 1251 GMT, 
15 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0715 via World News Connection) 
 
While Itera may not recover from this blow, it is too early to write off 
Turkmenistan. Significantly, Gazprom has not committed itself to the Uzbek 
strategy of marginalizing Turkmen gas. Gazprom itself is slated to buy 6 billion 
cubic meters of gas from Turkmenistan this year, with a 25-year contract greatly 
expanding that amount. (ITAR-TASS, 0747 GMT, 11 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0711 via World News Connection) Two days after his visit with Karimov, Miller 
met with Turkmen President Niyazov and declared a draft accord on building a 
new pipeline to accommodate Turkmen gas exports to Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 
1425 GMT, 24 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0703 via World News Connection) The 
full plan will not be released until mid-August at the earliest. However, previous 
Turkmen plans with Russia and Kazakhstan have resurfaced, prompting a 
renewed debate on a proposed pipeline along the Caspian coast (avoiding 
Uzbek territory altogether), capable of carrying 30 billion cubic meters of gas by 
2007. (INTERFAX, 0736 GMT, 29 May 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0629; ITAR-TASS, 
1446 GMT, 14 May 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0514 via World News Connection) Both 
Ukraine and Turkmenistan have redoubled their pleas for such a pipeline. It is 
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certainly in Russia’s and Gazprom’s interests to retain access to Turkmenistan’s 
gas supplies, which are expected to outlast Uzbekistan’s by decades. Karimov 
may hurt Uzbek interests in the long term by deliberately tightening supply on the 
Central Asia-Center pipeline, thus forcing the development of alternate routes on 
which Uzbekistan can collect no tariff or maintenance fee when its own gas is 
gone. 
 
Meanwhile, Turkmenistan continues to seek a gas outlet to the south. In October, 
an Asian Development Bank feasibility study is due on the famous Trans-Afghan 
pipeline. If built, this proposed line could transport another 30 billion cubic meters 
of gas per annum from the Daulatabad field in eastern Turkmenistan to South 
Asian markets. (INTERFAX, 0757 GMT, 26 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0626 via 
World News Connection) However, The News of Islamabad recently reported 
that the project has once again been put on hold for reassessment. (THE NEWS, 
08 Jul 03; FBIS-NES-2003-0707 via World News Connection) There are 
pervasive security issues with the pipeline’s Afghan segment, which passes 
through areas largely beyond the control of the Karzai government. Some 
investors have questioned whether the project will be worthwhile without Indian 
involvement (unlikely in the current tense atmosphere with Pakistan). Also, there 
have been reports that Gazprom convinced Turkmenistan to allow it to develop 
Daulatabad for northern extraction. The Turkmen government has strongly 
denied this, insisting that it is still committed to the Trans-Afghan route. (DAWN, 
18 Jul 03 via www.times.kg) Given its strategic interest in having an outlet for its 
gas that is not controlled either by Uzbekistan or Russia, Niyazov’s insistence is 
probably genuine. 
 
While Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan squabble over gas exports, Kazakhstan has 
been a clear winner, increasing its hydrocarbon export potential in all directions. 
It is expanding the Tengiz-Novorossiisk oil pipeline to Russia; discussing new 
Caspian oil shipments to Ukraine for sale on European markets; connecting its 
Caspian oilfields to China via new pipelines; and pledging eventually to ship gas 
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through Azerbaijan’s projected Baku-Ceyhan line, a pipeline much prompted by 
Turkey in Central Asia over the last few years as part of a "new Silk Road" 
sending oil and gas flowing both East and West from the Central Asian republics. 
(INTERFAX, 1406 GMT, 25 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0603; INTERFAX, 0534 
GMT, 19 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0719; INTERFAX, 0756 GMT, 3 Jun 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0603; INTERFAX, 1425 GMT, 4 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0604 via 
World News Connection) 
 
The Kazakh government has also initiated various Kazakh-Russian joint ventures 
to develop the reserves of the northern Caspian region. Though negotiations 
continue on each littoral country’s exact share of Caspian waters (see N.I.S. 
Observed, 28 May 03), Kazakhstan appears likely to emerge with the lion’s share 
of oil and gas. Recoverable hydrocarbon reserves are reported to be 2.1 billion 
tons in the Russian sector, 2.2 billion tons in Turkmenistan, 3.7 billion tons in 
Azerbaijan, 1 billion tons in Iran, and a whopping 4.356 billion tons of oil, 518 
billion cubic meters of free gas, and 61 million tons of gas condensate in the 
Kazakh sector. (INTERFAX, 1125 GMT, 23 Jun 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0623 via 
World News Connection) The Russian government seems to have agreed to 
Kazakhstan's various plans in exchange for extensive involvement by Russian 
companies in extracting and exploiting Kazakhstan’s reserves. Which country will 
gain the most in the long run remains to be seen. 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
Leave if you like 
The crisis sparked by Turkmenistan’s unilateral repudiation of its dual-citizenship 
arrangement with Russia (see N.I.S. Observed, 10 July 03) has subsided 
temporarily. After several meetings of a Russian-Turkmen special commission, 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Fedotov announced that the Turkmen 
government has dropped its requirement that Russian passport-holders must 
obtain an exit visa before they are able to leave the country. (ITAR-TASS, 1611 
GMT, 10 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0710 via World News Connection) This partly 
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addresses the fear that Russian citizens may find themselves trapped under 
Saparmurat Niyazov’s increasingly despotic rule, though President Niyazov has 
been careful not to guarantee any departing Russians a right to return. 
Nonetheless, the Russian government has declared this a partial victory, and the 
Duma has turned its attention to the problems of absorbing such Russians as 
may seek to leave Turkmenistan. 
 
The Turkmen-Russian commission will next meet in September or October – a 
long enough lapse for the nationalist fervor in the Duma to die down. The 
population in general is less fervid on the issue. A recent poll suggests that while 
a majority of Russians (56%) believe that their compatriots in Turkmenistan are 
suffering unjustly and 40% believe the government could do more to help them, 
only 5% support "firm" measures against Niyazov, 4% support economic 
sanctions, and a mere 2% support the use of force to address the problem. 17% 
want to solve the problem through diplomacy or appeals to international law. 
(INTERFAX, 1102 GMT, 10 Jul 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0710 via World News 
Connection) 
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